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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL - CORPORATION COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM RELITIGATING ISSUE ADJUDICATED IN PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION OF
ITS PRESIDENT. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co.
(Cal. 1962).
In a criminal action Teitelbaum was convicted of conspiracy to
commit grand theft, attempted grand theft, and the presentation and
filing of false insurance claims as a result of a fake robbery of a corporation of which he was president and controlling stockholder.1
The corporation brought a subsequent action to recover on insurance
policies for losses allegedly sustained in the same robbery. At the
trial it was conceded that the corporation was Teitelbaum's alter ego.
Held: The prior criminal conviction of Teitelbaum for attempt to
defraud the insurer operated as a bar to the corporation's action
under the policies. Teitelbaum, Furs Inc. v.Dominion Ins. Co., 25
Cal.Rptr.559, 375 P. 2d439 (1962).
A prior adjudication may be used in subsequent litigation in two
ways. First, it precludes the parties and their privies to an action
from relitigating the same cause of action once it has been reduced
to judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. This is
the true doctrine of res judicata., Second, it may have determined
specific issues which are binding on the parties and their privies in
subsequent actions involving different causes of action. This is collateral estoppel. If there has been no intervening change of law,
any issue directly adjudicated and necessarily involved in a judgment on the merits is conclusively settled by that judgment. The issue cannot again be litigated between the parties or their privies
in a subsequent action, whether or not the subject matter of the two
suits is the same.' It is uniformly held that the determination is
conclusive when the parties in both suits are the same.4 Where only
one party in the second action is the same as in the first, a majority
of courts hold the determination conclusive if the parties are in a derivative liability relationship. The relationships so recognized are
indemnitor-indemnitee, master-servant, and principal-agent. The
majority view requires a mutuality of estoppel between the parties
to the second action.5 A few jurisdictions hold the determination
conclusive if the one against whom the plea is7 asserted was a party
6
to the prior atcion. California follows this view.
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The California test asks three questions: (a) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with that presented in the
action in question? (b) Was there a final judgment on the merits?
(c) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party, or in
privity with a party, to the prior adjudication? If these three questions are answered affirmatively, collateral estoppel will apply.'
The questions taken as a test of collateral estoppel in California
are broad enough to include all four variations of the party relationships in the two actions. These situations are summarized thusly:9
ONE:
Case h. A sues B. Issue is decided for B.
Case II: A sues C. C attempts to use the issue from Case I defensively.
TWO:
Case I: A sues B. Issue is decided for A.
Case II. B sues C. C attempts to use the issue from Case I defensively.
THREE:
Case h. A sues B. Issue is decided for B.
Case Ih.C sues A. C attempts to use the issue from Case I offensively.
FOUR:
Case I A sues B. Issue is decided for A.
Case II: C sues B. C attempts to use the issue from Case I offensively.
The specific applicability of collateral estoppel to each of these
situations can be limited by a case-by-case determination.' °
At the time of Teitelbaum, California decisions involving pleas
of collateral estoppel had been rendered on cases with party relationships categorized as situations ONE, THREE and FOUR. The application of collateral estoppel in situation ONE" and in a case similar
to situation THREE'" was held valid; but, in situation FOUR it
was held invalid.' 3
8 Id.122 P.2d at 895.
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Teitelbaum involves situation TWO. In the criminal case Case I,
the state was the plaintiff and Teitelbaum was the defendant. In
the civil action Case II, the corporation, Teitelbaum's alter ego, was
the plaintiff and the insurance company was the defendant. The defendant in Case II used the fact of the robbery, determined adversely
to Teitelbaum in Case I, as a defense to the action in Case IL It is
important to keep in mind that Case I was a criminal action and
Case II was a civil action.
The court held that the three-question test was satisfied and ruled
that the criminal conviction conclusively determined the fact that
there was no robbery. Because of this the trial court's refusal to grant
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was reversible error. The
case was remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendant.
The words final judgment on the merits in the collateral estoppel
test were clearly defined. The issue must not only have been specifically litigated and necessarily determined, but must have been litigated under circumstances assuring full opportunity to be heard on
that issue. The court found that the safeguards present in a criminal
action, coupled with the threat of imprisonment, gave Teitelbaum
both opportunity and incentive to make as effective a defense as possible. This alleviated any problem of determining whether the one
against whom the plea was asserted should have foreseen the effect
of determinations in the prior action on subsequent litigation, and
therefore made a sufficient defense.
In support of its decision, the court in Teitelbaum cites Eagle Ins.
Co. v. Heller (Va.)," Mineo v. Burke Ins. Co. (Penn.)," and

Austin v. U.S. (7th Cir.).16 These cases are significant in determining the underlying reason for the result reached in Teitelbaum.
Virginia and Pennsylvania follow the majority view requiring mutuality. Nevertheless, in factual situations paralleling Teitelbaum,
both states and the Federal decision have held the prior criminal conviction could be used as a determination of fact in a civil case. These
three holdings were not decided by dispensing with the requirement
of mutuality of collateral estoppel but rather as a matter of public
policy.
The apparent effect of the Teitelbaum decision is to overrule California precedent,"7 and to place California among the growing
14
25
16

17

149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
182 Pa. Super. 75, 125 A. 2d 612 (1956).
125 F. 2d 816 (7th Cir. 1942).
29 CAL. Jun. 2D judgments § 228 (1956).

19641

RECENT CASES

minority in the use of a criminal conviction in a civil action."8 It
is beyond the scope of this note to discuss all the various ways prior
criminal convictions may be used in subsequent civil suits. It is interesting to note, however, that the California legislature has already
acted to limit the use of prior criminal actions in the area of motor
vehicle convictions."
The question thus becomes: Will California follow a Teitelbaum
factual situation where Case I was a civil and not a criminal action?
Successive actions arising from an automobile collision occurring
in California serve as an example. A, a passenger in Car I, brings an
action in a California court for personal injuries against B, the ownerdriver of Car 2. A recovers because B is found negligent. B then
brings an action, also in a California court, for personal injury and
property damage against C, the owner-driver of Car 1. C sets up
the defense of contributory negligence, establishd by the A-B action, and moves for a judgment against B. Should the motion be
granted?
At this point it is important to recall some of the differences in
California between criminal and civil actions. The criminal action is
procedurally controlled in favor of the defendant. He has a right to
be represented by counsel." Proof must be beyond reasonable
doubt.2 ' The verdict must be unanimous.2 2 Tactical use of the initiative in a civil action may greatly limit the defense available, while
such is not the case in a criminal action.
In view of the procedural differences, it cannot be said that a defendant in a civil action has had a full and unfettered opportunity
to litigate all issues necessarily decided therein. For this reason
it is believed that California should not extend collateral estoppel
to situation TWO which involves successive civil suits.
Although the court in Teitelbaum decides the case ostensibly on
the basis of collateral estoppel, the underlying reason appears to be
public policy. It has always been a fundamental principle to preclude
a convicted criminal from enforcing rights arising from his crime.
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With a broad test for collateral estoppel, the court was able to satisfy
the demands of public policy without resort to the words. Such a
public policy question would not be presented were Case I a civil
action.
The Teitelbaum decision, therefore, should be limited to its facts.
California used the broad wording of the collateral estoppel test to
encompass a factual situation where public policy dictated the outcome. In so doing, the court may have further muddied the not too
clear waters of collateral estoppel.
James W. Brannigan, Jr.

OF NEW YORK LAW FIRM FOUND
ETHICS -MEMBERS
GUILTY OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AS A RESULT OF THEIR ROLE IN THE PUBLISHING OF A SELFLAUDATORY ARTICLE IN LIFE MAGAZINE. I re Connelly (N.Y. 1963).
Four members of a New York law firm were censured by the
New York Supreme Court for professional misconduct due to violation of Canon 27 of Professional Ethics, New York State Bar Association. The court held that they knowingly and deliberately contributed to an article appearing in LIFE Magazine advertising their
law firm. In Re Connelly, 240 App. Div. 466, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 126
(1963).
The offending article,1 written in a flamboyant and exaggerated
style, gave a boost to this firm in an attempt to give the public a
"bird's eye view" of how a typical corporate law firm operates. The
firm's attorneys did little to discourage LIFE's praise.
LIFE bounced back from the court's holding with a critical editorial lampooning the decision.' LIFE stated that ". . . the judges
were wrong."; that Canon 27 ". . . curtains off the public right to
know what goes on in an important area of American society";' that

it was important for the public to know that laywers spend most of
their time keeping people out of court; and, that it was valuable for
the public to see what makes a law firm tick.
The American Bar JournalV gives a brief summary of this interesting case. It evaluates the court decision, criticizes LIFE's editorial,
and proceeds to rationalize the court's conclusions.
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